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Abstract
We assess the role of banks to the transmission of optimal and
exogenous changes in scal policy to the economy. We built-up a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with patient and im-
patient agents, banks and a government to nd that banks and their
associated capital-adequacy constraint mitigate the negative spill-over
e¤ects to the economy from higher taxes. Specically, we conrm that
labour income tax is the most distortionary scal instrument. The op-
timal choice of a housing tax is the most favorable funding source to
a temporary increase in public spending. The combination of housing
and labour taxes is the most preferred tax bundle to be optimally cho-
sen under negative output shocks. Moreover, a permanent increase in
housing tax is benecial if it is welfare enhancing and the existence of
banks benets mainly impatient households under permanently higher
consumption taxes. Finally, these results remain robust to various ro-
bustness checks.
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1 Introduction
This paper introduces a scal sector in a real business cycle model with
banks and nancial frictions. The importance of banks in macroeconomic
modelling has been well documented in the literature (see e.g. Brunnermeier
and Sannikov, 2014, Kollman et al., 2011, and Meh and Moran, 2010). How-
ever, the role of banks and the associated borrowing constraints, faced by
households and entrepreneurs, under optimal scal policy and various scal
policy reforms has not drawn the required attention in the literature.
This is specically relevant under the current economic climate where
scal policy is being used as the main source for enhancing economic growth
and the role of banks is re-evaluated. Moreover, it is crucial to examine under
this environment the role of the various nancial frictions in the economy
with housing being the key source of collateral. Housing is the key asset
for the vast majority of households in the U.S with 65% of the population
owning a house.1 In addition, the value of housing is even higher than that
of gross domestic product (GDP). As a result, housing a¤ects signicantly
the nancial constraints of agents in the economy (see also Alpanda and
Zubairy, 2016 and references therein) and it is even more pronounced under
the presence of banks (Iacoviello, 2015).
Moreover, the recent nancial and subsequent sovereign debt crisis shifted
the attention of policy-makers to scal policy, where many developed coun-
tries increased their level of public spending. In the United States, for exam-
ple, a new scal package was introduced to stimulate demand, mainly through
higher spending, according to The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlookof the
Congressional Budget O¢ ce. This policy increased decit at about $5.6 tril-
lion over the 2008-2012 period and debt to output ratio reached the level
of 74% in 2015.2 As a consequence, it is crucial to understand and identify
the macroeconomic implications of changes in scal policy instruments and
particularly tax rates that are used to nance the increased level of debt.
The optimal reaction of scal policy will be assessed under the assump-
tion that the government cannot issue debt to respond to exogenous shocks,
following Angelopoulos et al. (2017). This restriction is particularly rele-
vant under the current economic climate where many advanced economies
are restricted from using of debt a shock absorber mechanism.
Taking the above into consideration, this paper investigates how optimal
scal policy and various scal policy reforms (i.e. exogenous changes/ in-
creases in the tax structure) might a¤ect the economy in terms of output
1Data on Homeownership Rates for the US and Regions are for the period 1965-2015,
from Table 14 of the U.S. Census Bureau.
2This is the highest level of debt for the US in the post WWII period.
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and welfare under the presence of banks and nancially constrained agents,
using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Therefore,
we want to ll the gap in the literature that examines the role of banks and
scal policy separately. Our ultimate aim is to examine how the existence
of banks and nancial frictions a¤ect the economy: i) when the government
can optimally react to various negative shocks; and ii) when various scal
policy reforms are implemented to fund the increased level of spending.
Therefore, this paper also contributes to the related literature by assess-
ing the optimal scal policy under macroeconomic and nancial shocks. The
analysis of optimal scal policy will be focused on two types of policy ex-
periments. First, we are going to allow for one distorting tax at a time to
be optimally chosen under each shock. Comparing this with the case where
tax rates are being kept xed (benchmark case) will help us understand the
transmission mechanisms of each tax instrument. Second, we are going to
allow for a combination of the policy instruments to be optimally chosen
under each shock. For both policy experiments we will also assess the spill-
over e¤ects to aggregate output and consumption and identify the channels
through which scal policy a¤ects the economy and welfare.3
Our model follows Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005) work
by introducing banks and implementing nancially constrained households
and entrepreneurs with housing as a collateral. The objective is to assess the
interaction of banks as nancial intermediaries with a government and their
associated e¤ects on inequality and welfare.
Alpanda and Zubairy (2016), in a similar approach to our work, extend
Iacoviello (2005) earlier work by introducing a scal sector and renters to the
economy and by allowing housing to be endogenously determined. We also
allow for housing to be endogenously determined and we also introduce a rich
scal sector but we do not introduce renters and we deviate from nominal
rigidities.4 In addition, Alpanda and Zubairy (2016) did not include a bank-
ing sector, as in Iacoviello (2015) and our paper, and their focus was on the
housing-related tax changes and not on the role of banks to the propagation
mechanism of various scal policy reforms to the economy, as in our paper.
3Our paper is also related to the optimal taxation literature that examines the long
run properties of optimal capital and labour income taxes, see e.g. Chari et al., 1994
and Angelopoulos et al., 2015. However, our focus is to assess the role of banks under
various scal policy experiments and not the steady state outcome of the optimal tax
rates. Nevertheless, our results are comparable and in line with this literature as well, but
we choose not to focus on this aspect.
4Introducing renters in our model would be very interesting but we leave that for future
research. Alpanda and Zubairy (2016) introduced renters because they examined housing
specic tax polixy reforms.
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Finally, we also perform an optimal scal policy analysis.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), among oth-
ers, have established the importance of banks as nancial intermediaries,
applying a balanced sheet constraint. Iacoviello (2005) was the rst to intro-
duce a housing sector and monetary policy to assess the propagation mech-
anism of various shocks to the economy. Later on Iacoviello (2015) extended
his work introducing banks as nancial intermediaries in a Real Business
Cycle model, without monetary and scal policy, to assess the importance of
various nancial shocks in the economy.
On the scal policy aspect, most of the related papers apply an overlap-
ping generations model and examine the e¤ects of various real estate related
taxes (i.e. property tax, mortgage interest tax etc.) on home owners and
renters, i.e. Gervais (2002) and Chambers et al. (2009). More recently, Al-
panda and Zubairy (2016) implemented a dynamic general equilibrium model
to examine housing tax related policies.
In addition, Fernandez-Villaverde (2010) also examined the e¤ects on
output from various temporary scal shocks. However, he assumes that debt
will always adjust to nance the increased spending or the reduction in taxes
and he also abstracts from any optimal scal policy discussion. Therefore,
our paper can be seen as an extension of Fernandez-Villaverde (2010) work.
Our paper is also related to another strand of literature that examines
monetary and scal policy interactions in the presence of nancial frictions.
For example, Cui (2016) examines the monetary-scal interactions with liq-
uidity frictions using a simple scal rule for stabilization reasons with one
scal instrument and allow for debt to be optimally determined. In contrast,
we only focus on scal policy and we allow for transfers to follow a scal rule,
choosing optimally the level of taxes and keeping debt xed (due to the as-
sumed balanced budget constraint).5 In addition, Gomes and Seoane (2017)
focus on a monetary-scal policy mix in the presence of nancial frictions
over the recent crisis but without optimal scal policy analysis. As in our
paper, they also assume that debt is the residual instrument that balances
the government budget constraint under an exogenous scal policy. How-
ever, they only use a lump-sum tax which follows an autoregressive process,
whereas we have several scal instruments.
Therefore, our paper contributes to this literature by focusing on scal
policy in the presence of banks and nancial frictions implementing various
scal policy responses and an optimal scal policy analysis.
5Of course there are many ways to setup the model but we believe that under the
current economic climate where governments are restricted from issuing more debt, a
balanced budget restriction (where debt is xed) is not very unreasonable.
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To the best of our knowledge, there is no work on the propagation e¤ects
of (optimal) scal policy in a framework with banks as nancial intermedi-
aries, patient and impatient households and nancial frictions. Moreover,
the assessment of optimal scal policy under the current setup is novel.
We introduce a scal sector in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with banks, two types of households (patient and impatient) and en-
trepreneurs so as to be able to assess the various, and possibly asymmetric,
e¤ects of scal policy on di¤erent agents in the economy. Specically we fol-
low a standard calibration approach so as to match the key U.S. data over the
past three decades and we initially assess the e¤ects of optimal scal policy
under uncertainty to the economy.6 We also assess how various permanent
scal policy reforms a¤ect the economy and welfare of each agent, motivated
from the current economic climate that suggests the need to fund the high
level of debt and higher public spending via higher taxes.7
The main questions we would like to answer are: 1) What is the op-
timal scal policy recommendation under uncertainty and what is the role
of banks? 2) How the existence of banks a¤ects the propagation of higher
government spending and the transmission of various scal policy reforms to
the economy? 3) What are the welfare implications? 4) How a structural
change in the nancial frictions can a¤ect the transmission of the shocks to
the economy?
An overview of the main ndings is the following: i) The existence of
banks can mitigate the negative spillover e¤ects to the economy from higher
taxes under both optimal scal policy and various scal policy reforms; ii)
Optimal scal policy experiments under uncertainty conrm that labour
taxes are the most distortionary scal policy instrument; iii) When hous-
ing tax is used optimally as a source of nancing temporary higher govern-
ment spending it may lead to higher level of output in the short run; iv)
The optimal combination of labour and housing taxes is the most preferred
tax bundle; v) Permanently higher housing taxes and government spending
a¤ect mostly borrowerswelfare; vi) Entrepreneurs are mainly better o¤ fol-
lowing an increase in the consumption tax, due to the income redistribution
via transfers; vii) A decrease in the net worth of loan suppliers amplies the
negative spillover e¤ects to the economy; viii) Our main results are robust in
changes to the nancial frictions specication.
6Uncertainty in our model takes the form of temporary negative output shocks, such
as: negative total factor productivity shock, negative housing demand shock, positive
loan-to-value ratio shock and nally positive government spending shock.
7Under scal policy reforms we examine the economic and welfare implications from
a permanent increase in government spending, housing tax, labour tax and consumption
tax under the presence of banks.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents and
describes the model. Section 3 outlines the calibration. Section 4 presents
the results under exogenous and optimal scal policy. Section 5 illustrates
the results of permanent scal policy reforms along with various robustness
checks. Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusions.
2 Model
We employ a real business cycle model with two types of households (patient
and impatient), entrepreneurs, banks and a government. Patient households
are assumed to be the savers and owners of housing. They also work, con-
sume, make one-period deposits to banks and have access to one-period gov-
ernment bonds. Impatient households consume, work, own housing and have
access to one-period bank loans. The impatient households are under a bor-
rowing constraint determined by the value of their housing which is used as
collateral (i.e. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2015)). Entre-
preneurs hire workers from the two households, accumulate real estate and
borrow from banks. They are also under a borrowing constraint which is de-
termined by the value of their collateral and the wage rates paid in advance,
as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005). Banks borrow from patient households,
in the form of deposits, and provide one-period loans to impatient house-
holds and entrepreneurs. Finally, government spending is nanced via debt,
lump-sum transfers, consumption, labour and housing taxes.
2.1 Patient households
Patient households have the following objective function:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tP

logCP;t + jA
J
t logHP;t +  log(1 NP;t)

(1)
where E0 is the conditional expectations operator at period 0; 0 < tP < 1 is
the time discount factor; CP;t and NP;t are private consumption and working
hours respectively at period t; and HP;t is housing at period t. AJt denotes
a demand shock to housing. The parameters j and  capture the weights of
real estate and leisure on the welfare respectively.
The demand shock, AJt , is assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic
AR(1) process:
log
 
AJt+1

= (1  AJ ) log
 
AJ

+ AJ log
 
AJt

+ "A
J
t (2)
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where "A
J
t is independently and identically distributed Gaussian random vari-
able with zero mean and standard deviation given by AJ .
The representative patient household chooses consumption, labour, hous-
ing, bonds and deposits, CP;t, NP;t, HP;t, Bt and Dt respectively, so as to
maximize equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint: 
1 + Ct

CP;t +Dt +Bt + qt
 
HP;t  
 
1  Ht

HP;t 1

(3)
= RP;t 1Dt 1 +RB;t 1Bt 1 +
 
1  Wt

WP;tNP;t + trt
where we assume that patient households have deposits, Dt, at the bank
earning a gross return RP;t. It is further assumed that patient households
have access to government bonds, Bt, with a gross return RB;t. In addition,
qt denotes the relative price of housing and Ht is the property tax rate on
housing. WP;t is the wage rate and Wt is the labour tax rate. Finally, patient
households receive lump-sum transfers from the government, trt, and they
are subject to a consumption tax, Ct .
2.2 Impatient households
Impatient households have the following objective function:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tI

logCI;t + jA
J
t logHI;t +  log(1 NI;t)

(4)
where 0 < tI < 1 is the time discount factor with 0 < 
t
I < 
t
P ; CI;t and
NI;t are private consumption and working hours respectively at period t; and
HP;t is housing at period t.
The representative impatient household chooses consumption, labour,
housing and loans, CI;t, NI;t, HI;t and LI;t, respectively, so as to maximize
equation (4) subject to the following budget constraint: 
1 + Ct

CI;t +RI;t 1LI;t 1 + qt
 
HI;t  
 
1  Ht

HI;t 1

(5)
= LI;t +
 
1  Wt

WI;tNI;t + trt
where we assume that impatient households receive bank loans, LI;t, with
gross interest rate RI;t. It is further assumed that impatient households do
not have access to government bonds and they are subject to a property tax
rate on housing Ht . Their wage rate is dened as, WP;t, and it is subject to
a labour tax rate, Wt . Impatient households also receive lump-sum transfers
from the government, trt and are subject to a consumption tax, Ct .
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Impatient households are assumed to be constraint on the amount they
are able to borrow given their stock of real estate:
LI;t  ILI;t 1 + (1  I)AMt mIEt

qt+1
RI;t
HI;t

(6)
where I captures the inertia in the adjustment of the borrowing constraint
over time and the parameter mI determines the loan-to-value ratio in terms
of the real estate used as a collateral.8 In addition, AMt captures an exogenous
shock on the loan-to-value ratio and it follows an AR(1) process:
log
 
AMt+1

= (1  AM ) log
 
AM

+ AM log
 
AMt

+ "A
M
t (7)
where "A
M
t is independently and identically distributed Gaussian random
variable with zero mean and standard deviation given by AM .
2.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs behave similarly to impatient households with the following
objective function:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tE [logCE;t] (8)
where we assume that 0 < E

1  ((1  B) B + (1  B) ) 1 BRP1 BB

<
B.9
The representative entrepreneur chooses consumption, CE;t, housing,HE;t
and loans LE;t, so as to maximize equation (8) subject to the following budget
constraint: 
1 + Ct

CE;t +RE;tLE;t 1 + qtHE;t +WP;tNP;t +WI;tNI;t (9)
= Yt + LE;t + qt
 
1  Ht

HE;t 1 + trt
where LE;t denotes the bank loans with gross interest rate RE;t. It is further
assumed that entrepreneurs are subject to a property tax rate on housing Ht ,
receive lump-sum transfers from the government, trt, and they are subject
to a consumption tax, Ct .
8Following, Iacoviello (2015) the borrowing constraint is binding around the steady
state if the time discount factor of impatient households satises the following: I <
1  ((1  B) B + (1  B) ) 1 BRP1 BB

B .
9See Iacoviello (2015) for more details on this restriction.
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Furthermore, entrepreneurs are subject to the following borrowing con-
straint:
LE;t  ELE;t 1 + (1  E)AMt
"
mEHEt

qt+1
RE;t+1
HE;t

 mEN (WP;tNP;t +WI;tNI;t)
#
(10)
where, as in the impatient households, E captures the inertia in the adjust-
ment of the borrowing constraint over time. The parameter mEH determines
the loan-to-value ratio in terms of their real estate stock used as collateral.
The term mEN captures the assumption that a fraction of the wage payment
needs to be made in advance, following Iacoviello (2015) and Neumeyer and
Perri (2005).
Entrepreneurs combine real estate and labour supply from patient and
impatient households to produce the nal output given by:
Yt = AZ;t (HE;t 1)
v (NP;t)
(1 v)(1 ) (NI;t)
(1 v) (11)
where v determines the share of entrepreneurs real estate on the production
process and  determines the relative share of impatient labour supply in the
production.
Total factor productivity, AZ;t, is assumed to follow a stochastic exoge-
nous AR(1) process:
log (AZ;t+1) = (1  AZ ) log (AZ) + AZ log (AZ;t) + "AZt (12)
where "AZt is independently and identically distributed Gaussian random vari-
able with zero mean and standard deviation given by AZ .
2.4 Banks
Banks have the following objective function:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tB logCB;t (13)
where, following Iacoviello (2015) we set 0 < B < P .
The representative bank chooses consumption, CB;t, deposits, Dt, and the
loans given to impatient households and entrepreneurs, LI;t and LE;t respec-
tively, so as to maximize (13) subject to the following budget constraint: 
1 + Ct

CB;t +RP;t 1Dt 1 + LE;t + LI;t (14)
= Dt +RE;tLE;t +RI;t 1LI;t 1 + trt
8
where Ct is the consumption tax rate and trt are the lump-sum transfers.
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The bank is also subject to a capital adequacy constraint:
Lt  Dt  B (Lt 1  Dt 1) + (1  ) (1  B)Lt (15)
where it states that bank equity must exceed a fraction of bank assets. The
parameter  captures the liabilities to asset ratio and the parameter D
captures the inertia in the capital adequacy constraint.
2.5 The government
The governments budget constraint is given by:
Ht (HP;t 1 +HI;t 1 +HE;t 1) + 
W
t (WP;tNP;t +WI;tNI;t)+
Ct (CP;t + CI;t + CE;t + CB;t) = Gt +RB;t 1Bt 1  Bt + trt (16)
where Gt denotes public spending.
Following Leeper et al. (2010) and Alpanda and Zubairy (2016) we allow
for transfers to adjust with government debt so as for the government not to
run a Ponzi scheme.
^
trt =  Y
^
Y t   B
^
Bt 1
where the hatted-variables,
^
x, denote the percent deviations from the steady-
state of the respective variable The parameter Y and B are the reaction
coe¢ cients of the percentage change of transfers to the percentage deviation
of current output and lagged debt.11
We further assume that spending follow an exogenous AR(1) process:
log (Gt+1) = g log (Gt) + (1  g) log (G) + "Gt (17)
where G is the level of government spending at the steady-state and "Gt
is independently and identically distributed Gaussian random variable with
zero mean and standard deviation given by G.
10Banks lump-sum transfers by the government are being set to zero. We only use them
as a robustness check towards the end of the paper.
11In our experiments we want to have transfers to savers and borrowers only. Therefore,
transfers to banks are assumed to be zero throughout the paper, apart from a robustness
check towards the end of the paper. However, they do not signicantly a¤fect our results
if they follow a similar pattern witht the rest of the transfers. These results are available
upon request.
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2.6 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions for private consumption and housing are given
by:
CP;t + CI;t + CE;t + CB;t = Ct (18)
HP;t +HI;t +HE;t = 1 (19)
To solve the model dynamics we use Dynare and we estimate our model
using a non-linear version of the system of equations and under the assump-
tion that all the constraints outlined above are binding.
2.7 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given initial levels of the assets, Hj;0, B0, the initial deposits of patient house-
holds D0, the stationary stochastic processes for technology, government
spending, loan-to-value ratio and housing demand fAZ;t; Gt; AMt ; AJt g1t=0 for
j = P; I; E, the decentralized competitive equilibrium system of equations is
characterized by a sequence of allocations fCP;t; CI;t; CE;t; CB;t; HP;t; HI;t;
HE;t; NP;t; NI;t; Bt; Dt; LI;t; LE;tg1t=0 and prices fWP;t; WI;t; qt; RP;t; RB;t;
RI;t; RE;tg1t=0 such that: (i) both types of households, entrepreneurs and
banks maximize their welfare, taking prices as given; (ii) the government
budget constraint is satised in each period and (iii) all markets clear.12
3 Calibration
For our calibration we follow the papers of Iacoviello (2015) and Leeper et al.
(2010), along with annual U.S. scal data obtained from Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) and Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) from St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank. The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table
1.
The welfare parameters, time preferences and the parameters regarding
the nancial frictions are set as in Iacoviello (2015). Moreover, the consump-
tion tax and the reaction coe¢ cients of the scal rules are set as in Leeper
12The rst order conditions of our model are presented and briey discussed in the
appendix.
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et al. (2010).13
Table 1: Model parameters
Parameter Value Denition Source
0 < P< 1 0.9925 time discount factor patient hh Iacoviello (2015)
0 < I< 1 0.940 time discount factor impatient hh Iacoviello (2015)
0 < E< 1 0.940 time discount factor entrepreneurs Iacoviello (2015)
0 < B< 1 0.945 time discount factor for banks Iacoviello (2015)
j 0.075 real estate weight in utility Iacoviello (2015)
 2.000 weight of leisure in utility Iacoviello (2015)
mI 0.900 loan-to-value ration - impatient hh Iacoviello (2015)
mEH 0.900 loan-to-value ration - entrepreneurs Iacoviello (2015)
mEN 1.000 advanced wage payment for entrepr. Iacoviello (2015)
I 0.711 inertia impatients borr. constr. Iacoviello (2015)
E 0.631 inertia entrepreneurs borr constr. Iacoviello (2015)
B 0.234 inertia in banks capital adequacy Iacoviello (2015)
 0.900 banks liabilities to asset ratio Iacoviello (2015)
v 0.050 share of real estate in output Iacoviello (2015)
 0.3273 wage share in output Iacoviello (2015)
Y 0.130 reaction of transfers to output Leeper et al. (2010)
B 0.500 reaction of transfers to debt Leeper et al. (2010)
0 <G
c
Y
< 1 0.250 government spending calibration
0 <B
Y
< 1 0.530 debt to output ratio data
W 0.220 e¤ective labour income tax data
H 0.014 average housing tax data
C 0.023 average consumption tax Leeper et al. (2010)
r 0.000 lump-sum transfers assumption
AZ 0.950 AR(1) coe¢ cient of TFP Iacoviello (2015)
g 0.800 AR(1) coe¢ cient of gov. spending data
AJ 0.990 AR(1) coef. of housing demand Iacoviello (2015)
AM 0.850 AR(1) coef. of LTV ratio Iacoviello (2015)
Furthermore, in our model we calibrate the government spending over
output ratio so as to get a steady-state debt to output ratio of about 53%,
in annual terms. The data we used on total public debt are for the period
1979-2014 from FRED.14 As a result the implied government spending to
output ratio in our model is about 25%. Moreover, we normalize transfers
to be equal to zero at the steady-state.
13Note that here we assume that all the transfers rules are identical. An interesting
extension of the paper would be to estimate the various rules for each agent and then
assess the impact of the policy reforms. We leave that for future research.
14The series for total public debt refers to GFDEBTN series published by FRED.
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The e¤ective labour income tax is calculated using data from ECFIN and
applying Martinez-Mongay (2000) approach.15 Regarding the property tax
we use data from the Minnesota Taxpayers Association (2011) study.
For the calibration of the autocorrelation parameter of the government
spending series we utilize annual data from the U.S. BEA for the period 1979-
2014.16 We then estimate the persistence of the AR(1) process, g, using
the cyclical component of the series through an HP-lter. In addition, the
constant terms of the TFP, housing demand and loan-to-value ratio processes
are normalized to unity and their autocorrelation parameters are set similar
to Iacoviello (2015).
4 Solution and results
In order to analyze the role of banks on the economy we also create another
economy without banks for comparison. In that case the patient households
become the nancial intermediary instead of banks and provide loans to
impatient households and entrepreneurs, similarly to Iacoviello (2005) and
Alpanda and Zubairy (2016).
4.1 Impulse response analysis
4.1.1 Testing the empirical validity of the model
Initially, we want to check the e¤ects of the banking sector to the economy
following a temporary positive total factor productivity (TFP) and govern-
ment spending shock. The case of the TFP shock is being used to establish
the empirical plausibility of our model. We also show the impulse responses
of the main variables under a temporary positive shock to housing demand
and loan-to-value ratio to further assess our model.
Figures 1-4
Figure 1 presents the impulse responses under a temporary 1% increase
in TFP. The results for consumption and output do not di¤er signicantly
between the case with and without banks, similarly to Iacoviello (2015). How-
ever, our results indicate that without banks the TFP shock will increase the
deposits and loans substantially in the short run due to the higher disposable
15In particular, we use the LITR rate for e¤ective average labour income tax. The exact
data series required for this construction are described in Martinez-Mongay (2000).
16This series refers to government consumption expenditures and gross investment from
NIPA Table 1.1.5.
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income via transfers and the elimination of the capital adequacy constraint.
This leads to higher stock of real estate for the borrowers and lower for the
savers. Moreover, debt will deviate from its steady state more for the case
with banks because patient households are restricted from transforming their
saving to investment, due to the banks capital adequacy constraint, leading
to higher investment in bonds. Finally, patient households manage to keep
a similar level of consumption compared to the case with banks even with a
lower supply of labour due to the higher returns from bonds and deposits.
Figure 2 presents the impulse responses from a temporary 1% increase
in government spending. In this case, similarly to the TFP case, deposits
uctuate slightly more without banks compared to the case with banks. The
drop in the deposits, due to the imposed scal rule and the higher real estate
stock of patient households, leads also to a drop in the loans and the real
estate stock as a consequence. Moreover, the wage rates will decline more in
the case without banks because of the lower loans the entrepreneurs receive
and the assumed restriction of paying their wage bill in advance. Finally, debt
deviates more in the case with banks, similarly to the TFP case discussed
earlier.
In Figure 3 we present the case of a positive temporary shock to loan-
to-value ratio. This shock imposes a stronger borrowing constraint since
additional loans require a higher collateral. As a result, the stock of housing
for the borrowers increases immediately after the shock, leading to a higher
level of deposits. Overall consumption decreases initially, due to the lower
consumption of the patient households after their increase in deposits. More-
over, we observe that the economy under no banks exhibits more volatility
mainly due to the elimination of the capital adequacy constraint. There is
also an asymmetric reaction in the level of debt under the case with and with-
out banks due to the stronger increase in output which leads to a pronounced
reduction in transfers.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of a temporary one percent
increase in housing demand. This shock leads to an increase in house prices
which relax the nancial frictions of the borrowers. As a result, borrowers
consumption and loans increase. Under this shock we do not observe any
signicant di¤erences between the two economies with and without banks,
similarly to Iacoviello (2015).
4.2 Optimal scal policy
Having established the empirical plausibility of our model with the above
impulse responses we are now going to assess the optimal scal policy recom-
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mendation under each shock.17 In other words, we want to assess the impact
to the economy when we allow the central planner (government) to optimally
choose one scal policy instrument (tax rate) in each case under a balanced
budget restriction. Therefore, we assume that the central planner cannot
issue debt to fund the higher level of spending or lower level of revenue, as
we assumed in the exogenous scal policy, similarly to Stockman (2001) and
Angelopoulos et al., (2017).18
To solve the optimal scal policy problem the government chooses the
scal instrument(s) to maximize aggregate welfare subject to the optimal-
ity conditions of households, entrepreneurs and banks and the government
budget constraint along with the scal rule for transfers under commitment.
Our aim is to identify the optimal scal policy reaction in terms of distort-
ing taxes when the government cannot use debt or a non-distorting policy
instrument to absorb the scal implications of various shocks to the economy
(see, for example, Angelopoulos et al. (2017) for a similar application).
4.2.1 Adjusting one scal policy instrument
Taking the above into consideration, it is expected that for the case where
only one scal instrument adjusts under each shock, the tax rate will need
to increase to balance out the budget constraint of the government under
a negative shock to output (i.e. negative TFP shock) or a positive shock
to government spending. However, the optimal change of each tax rate and
its e¤ect to the economy is not anticipated and each instrument a¤ects the
economy di¤erently. Therefore, this experiment will help us understand the
transmission mechanisms of each scal instrument.
Figures 5 and 6 show the impulse responses of output and consumption
(rst and second row) as well as the scal instrument we allow to optimally
adjust each time (last row) with and without banks. Specically, Figure 5
illustrates the cases of a temporary negative TFP shock (rst three columns)
and a positive government spending shock (last three columns), whereas
Figure 6 shows the cases of a temporary positive shock to loan-to-value ra-
tio (rst three columns) and a negative housing demand shock (last three
17Note that we are going to implement shocks that create a negative e¤ect on output.
18If we allow debt to be chosen optimally in our setup will lead to unrealistically high
level of capital tax (more than 100%) during the rst period so as to nance debt. In
the subsequent periods debt turns to assets and capital tax (housing in our case) goes to
zero. This result is mainly theoretical and without any empirical/realistic aspect due to
the conscatory capital tax in the rst period to fully fund debt. In addition, assuming
an optimal scal policy under a balanced budget restriction is empirically relevant since
under the current economic climate many advanced countries are restricted from issuing
more debt to nance higher government spending.
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columns).
Figures 5-6
As we can see, taxes increase under a negative shock to the economy to
compensate the loss in the tax revenues and balance out the government
budget constraint. In addition, taxes also increase to fund the increase in
government spending.
In more detail, we observe that consumption tax reacts stronger to the
shocks compared to the other taxes to balanced out the budget constraint
since it is assumed to have a very low tax base. In addition, under the
government spending shock, the consumption tax has a very limited e¤ect on
output and mainly reduces the level of consumption, similarly to Fernandez-
Villaverde (2010). Housing tax a¤ects only the intertemporal choices of the
agents and as a result it is the least distorting instrument for the economy
when it is used as a shock absorber. Therefore, we observe that when we
allow for housing taxes to adjust output and consumption do not deviate as
much from their steady state. In addition, under an increase in government
spending, the use of housing tax can even lead to an increase in output.19
Finally, labour income taxes are the most distorting scal instrument as they
a¤ect the intratemporal decisions of the agents. This leads to a signicantly
stronger reduction in output and consumption when they are used as a shock
absorbing mechanism.
Comparing the cases with and without banks we observe that the exis-
tence of banks can mitigate the negative spill over e¤ects to the economy from
the use of optimal scal policy and the associated increase in the tax rates to
balance the government budget constraint.20 This is even more pronounced
under the case where the labour taxes adjust. In that case the existence of
banks can lead to a signicantly lower reduction in output and consumption.
Therefore, under the case of constrained banks, that e¤ectively control the
amount of savings transformed into investment goods, the negative e¤ects
from a higher labour income tax are mitigated, whereas under a frictionless
economy, where patient households provide the loans without any constraint,
these e¤ects are amplied.21 This result provides an interesting extension of
19This is consistent with the optimal taxation literature which shows that capital taxes
are the least distorting scal instrument and they should be used to absorb any shocks
(i.e. Stockman, 2001 and Angelopoulos et al., 2016).
20Note here that the impulse responses of positive and negative shocks are symmetric.
Therefore, comparing the negative TFP shock in Figure 5 under optimal scal policy,
for example, with the positive TFP shock in Figure 1 without optimal scal policy is
straightforward.
21Note that without banks all savings can be transformed into investment goods at no
cost.
15
Iacoviello (2015) that shows that banks matter only for the case where there
are redistribution shocks that transfer resources away from banks. Our result
intuitively means that due to the higher labour income tax the households
would like to smooth their consumption via the use of their savings (pa-
tient households) and loans (impatient households). However, the existence
of banks prevents the frictionless transformation of savings to investment
goods, controlling the propagation of the shocks to the economy.
4.2.2 Using a combination of scal instruments
In this section we allow for the government to optimally choose two scal
instruments at a time. Thus, the bundles of possible used scal combinations
are: W   H ; W   C ; and H   C .22
Allowing for two tax rates to optimally adjust creates an interesting puzzle
to the central planner. In the previous section, the central planner couldnt
set the value of the tax rate at any level optimally, since it was constrained
to be used so as to balance out the budget. Now, given the nancial frictions
of our model that introduce an additional intertemporal distortion, the cen-
tral planner needs to optimally choose a combination of distortionary taxes
to restore e¢ ciency in intertemporal margins and also balance the budget
constraint. Thus, the central planner should optimally choose the tax rates
so as to minimize the distortions to the economy from increased taxes and
also alleviate the ine¢ ciencies caused by the nancial frictions.
Figures 7 and 8 replicate the experiments of the previous section, as
shown in Figures 5-6, with the addition of a second tax rate in the optimal
scal policy menu. Therefore, Figure 7 shows again the impulse responses
under a temporary negative TFP shock (rst three columns) and a positive
government spending shock (last three columns), whereas Figure 8 shows
responses to a temporary positive shock to loan-to-value ratio (rst three
columns) and a negative housing demand shock (last three columns). The
last two rows in each gure show the two tax rates that optimally adjust in
each scenario.
Figures 7-8
Comparing these results with the case where the government could only
choose one scal instrument, we observe that there is a lower reduction in
22It is not possible to allow for all three scal instruments to be optimally chosen at once
because there is no unique steady state to this problem. This is straightforward to proof.
Using equations A1-A4 for Patient households, for example, presented in the appendix we
can show that equations A2 and A4 at the steady state give the arbitrage condition for
the interest rate of deposits and bonds. Then we have two equations A1 and A3 to pin
down three tax rates which leads to indeterminacy.
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output and in some instances it can even increase. Therefore, the government
is more e¢ cient under a richer basket of policy instruments. This is consis-
tent with the related optimal scal policy literature that shows a Pareto
improvement outcome under a full set of scal instruments, e.g. Correia
(1999).
In addition, we nd that the government will avoid using labour tax
as a shock absorbing mechanism due to its highly distortive nature. As a
result, the alternative policy instrument (either housing or consumption tax)
is mainly used to balance the budget constraint of the government. This is
also consistent with the labour tax smoothing result of the related optimal
taxation literature (i.e. Chari et al., 1994 and Angelopoulos et al., 2015).
Finally, we observe that under the case without banks the economy is
more volatile and the optimal reaction of the various scal instruments is
stronger under each shock, as in the previous case where the government
could only use one scal instrument optimally.
4.3 Aggregate e¤ects on output
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the e¤ects on output under exogenous (Table 2)
and under optimal scal policy (Table 3) as a percent deviation from the
steady state following a one percent temporary shock, as illustrated in each
row of the table. The shocks presented in these tables are the same shocks
we have implemented at the impulse responses under optimal scal policy
above.
Starting with the case of a negative shock to TFP we observe that the
use of optimal scal policy and the associated distortionary taxes, generates
a stronger negative e¤ect on output. This negative e¤ect is even higher
without banks in the majority of the experiments. There is only a short run
positive e¤ect on output under optimal scal policy with labour and housing
taxes. This is mainly driven from the signicantly lower labour tax rate
which a¤ects positively the intratemporal margin leading to positive short
run economic e¤ects. The increase in the housing tax a¤ects negatively only
the intertemporal margin. Therefore, in the rst period after the shock low
labour taxes drive the positive e¤ect on output which quickly turns negative
in the subsequent periods due to the higher housing tax. In the long run
every case derives negative e¤ects on output of about 0.1-0.2 percent apart
from the case under labour taxes and no banks, where the negative e¤ect on
output is doubled.
Regarding the government spending shock we can see that under an ex-
ogenous scal policy regime it is better for debt to adjust so as to balance
the budget constraint of the government (exogenous scal policy regime) and
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not any individual distortionary scal instrument. However, we can see that
when the government can optimally choose any two scal instruments it is
better to adjust labour and housing taxes, which will increase output signif-
icantly in the short run, similarly to the TFP case. In the long run there are
no signicant benets for output from a temporary increase in government
spending, irrespective of the nancing method.23
Following the temporary increase in the loan-to-value ratio we observe
that there is a negative e¤ect on output in the short run. However, in the
medium and long run there are positive e¤ects on output. This means that
the initial tightening on loans creates additional incentives for the constraint
agents to increase their savings and their stock of housing leading to higher
future output via its input in the production process. Moreover, we observe
that when housing and consumption taxes are used optimally there will be
signicant positive e¤ects on output even in the short run. As we have shown
in the impulse responses earlier, under this scenario the housing tax reduces
signicantly enhancing the accumulation of housing. We also observe that,
in general, under no banks the e¤ects on output are more pronounced.
Finally, under the case of a negative temporary decrease in housing de-
mand we observe a short run increase in output in the majority of the ex-
periments we perform. This shock leads to an increase in house prices which
relax the nancial frictions of the borrowers creating an increase in loans and
stock of housing. Those e¤ects increase consumption and output in the short
run. However, as house prices decrease the agents increase their savings via
a reduction in consumption and stock of housing (mainly for entrepreneurs),
creating a negative e¤ect on output. In the long run we observe that output
exhibits a marginal decrease compared to the steady state. This result is
robust under each scenario of optimal scal policy with the exception of the
case with labour and housing taxes. In this case the government is able to
generate large positive output e¤ects in the short run via the initially low
labour taxes which are su¢ cient to create a marginally positive long run
23As we discussed earlier, this is mainly due to the assumption that government spending
are not productive in this model.
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e¤ect.
Table 2: E¤ects on output as a percent deviation from the steady state
under exogenous scal policy
T = t+ 1 T = t+ 10 T = t+ 100 T !1
Panel A: With Banks
TFP -0.8869 -0.7202 -0.2393 -0.1521
G 0.1428 0.0562 0.0092 0.0058
AM -0.0075 0.0097 0.0018 0.0011
AJ -0.0731 -0.0337 0.0052 0.0046
Panel B: Without Banks
TFP -0.8811 -0.7272 -0.2331 -0.1481
G 0.1521 0.0574 0.0100 0.0064
AM -0.0201 0.0186 0.0020 0.0013
AJ -0.0596 -0.0369 0.0063 0.0054
4.4 Welfare e¤ects
In this section we report the welfare e¤ects from the various cases presented
above using the consumption equivalence approach. Assuming that the wel-
fare of each agent under optimal scal policy is given by W fpJ and under
exogenous scal policy by W 0J , then the consumption equivalent gain/loss of
each agent under each shock is calculated as:
W 0J
 
j; C
0
j ; H
0
j ; N
0
j

= W fpJ

Cfpj ; H
fp
j ; N
fp
j

(20)
1X
t=0
tjU
 
(1 + j)C
0
j ; H
0
j ; N
0
j

=
1X
t=0
tjU

Cfpj ; H
fp
j ; N
fp
j

(21)
where j is the consumption equivalent gain/loss of the use of optimal scal
policy for each source of uncertainty.
Using the logarithmic utility function applied in our analysis we get the
following expression for the consumption equivalent gain/loss:
j = exp
0BB@W fpJ  W 0J 11P
t=0
tj
1CCA  1 (22)
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Tables 4 and 5 present the values of the consumption equivalent in per-
centage terms for each agent (in columns) and for each temporary shock (in
rows). We should note here that the steady state of our economy is di¤erent
for the case with and without banks, similar to Iacoviello (2015). In particu-
lar, the capital requirement constraint of the banks is not present under the
no-banks case and as a result there are no frictions in the transformation of
savings to investment. This leads to higher levels of consumption, stock of
real-estate and loans in the economy without banks. This needs to be taken
into account when we perform the welfare analysis below.
Positive values indicate that the agent is better o¤ under the optimal
scal policy and vice versa. Moreover, the values reported in Tables 4 and 5
are for t!1.24
Under the exogenous scal policy (Table 4) we observe similar welfare
e¤ects for the two cases, with and without banks. The only di¤erence appears
to be in the case of a positive shock to loan-to-vale ratio, AM , where the
impatient household is better o¤ under no banks since, in this case, there is
an unconstraint provision of loans from the patient households. Moreover,
under exogenous scal policy the existence of banks mitigates the negative
welfare e¤ects for borrowers under the temporary negative housing demand
shock.
Moving to the case of optimal scal policy (Table 5) we need to mention
that the central planner maximizes the aggregate welfare of the economy.
Therefore, it is natural to observe asymmetries and di¤erences in the welfare
of each agent under each scenario. In these experiments it might be optimal
for one agent to be better o¤ while the others are worse o¤ compared to
the exogenous scal policy case. In more detail, we observe that under a
temporary negative TFP shock the welfare of impatient households is the
one that decreases the most. This is even more pronounced under the case of
a labour tax (especially without banks), since they are nancially constraint
and not able to smooth out their consumption.
Under a temporary positive government spending shock, G, we observe
that the welfare of patient households is generally stable. However, the wel-
fare of the borrowers improves when the government has access to two scal
policy instruments. This result remains relatively valid even when banks are
not present. Therefore, nancing increased government spending via a com-
bination of tax rates and not debt leads to a Pareto improvement, especially
from the borrowers perspective.
The case of a temporary increase in the loan-to-value ratio shock, AM ,
24We also have the results for intermediate periods but we do not present them here to
save space. These results are available on request.
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creates signicant welfare gains for the borrowers when housing tax is used
together with consumption tax. This result conrms our earlier ndings
showing that the lower housing tax enhances the accumulation of real estate
for borrowers. Moreover, when housing tax is used together with labour
income tax, we observe that impatient households are mainly better o¤,
from the borrowers point of view, due to the direct e¤ect of the lower labour
income taxes on their consumption and welfare as a consequence.
Finally, the case of a temporary negative housing demand shock, AJ ,
creates marginal welfare gains for the impatient households when labour
income tax is optimally chosen together with either consumption or housing
tax. Entrepreneurs mainly benet from the coexistence of housing tax with
another scal instrument. However, these benets disappear when banks are
not present with the exception of the labour and housing tax case where
impatient households benet more due to the pronounced reduction in the
labour income tax.
Table 4: Welfare e¤ects (% of consumption equivalent)
under exogenous scal policy
Patient hh Impatient hh Entrepr. Bank
Panel A: With Banks
TFP -0.1606 -0.9514 -1.1230 -0.8471
G -0.0040 -0.1380 -0.1137 -0.1994
AM 0.0021 -0.0049 0.0049 0.6033
AJ 0.0099 -0.0998 -0.1851 -0.6510
Panel B: Without Banks
TFP -0.1874 -0.9104 -0.9475 -
G -0.0049 -0.1417 -0.1059 -
AM 0.0011 0.0253 -0.0025 -
AJ 0.0096 -0.1324 -0.2379 -
5 Exogenous policy experiments
In this section we would like to examine the impact on the economy under
exogenous scal policy reforms. These policy reforms are assumed to be
exogenous and permanent changes (increases) in each tax rate. We believe
that this is empirically relevant since, after the recent nancial and sovereign
debt crises, most of the developed countries face high level of debt and there
is the need to reduce it via higher taxation. In addition, many countries
have announced the increase in their level of public spending in an e¤ort to
increase the observed low levels of economic growth.
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This creates an interesting puzzle for the policy-makers regarding the use
of the most appropriate source of nancing the increased public spending and
high level of debt. Here we assume that the government is able to change
(increase) permanently one scal instrument at a time as a source of funding.
This will generate negative spillover e¤ects to the economy and welfare of each
agent which need to be taken into account. At the previous sections we have
shown what should be the optimal scal policy under temporary shocks. Now
though we are interested in assessing the e¤ects on the economy following
permanent changes of scal instruments under no uncertainty. Moreover,
given our model setup, we also aim at assessing the role of banks to these
scal policy reforms.
Taking the above into consideration, Table 6 presents the e¤ects on out-
put from a permanent 1% increase in government spending (G), housing tax
(H), labour tax (W ) and consumption tax (C).25 The variable in the
brackets in the rst column of Table 6 indicates the residual instrument that
adjusts following the permanent scal policy reform to balance the govern-
ment budget constraint. For example, under the case of G (W ) we have a
1% increase in government spending nanced by higher labour income taxes.
In addition, we perform this analysis for the case with banks (Panel A) and
for the case without banks (Panel B).
In terms of the government spending shock (rst row in each panel) we
observe that the results are similar in both cases, with and without banks,
when it is nanced via debt. This is probably due to the fact that we have
assumed that government spending is not-productive in our setup26.
Under the case of higher government spending we also assess the e¤ects
on output under di¤erent nancing methods (housing, labour and consump-
tion taxes). These experiments are directly comparable to the optimal scal
policy analysis performed in the previous section where we allowed one s-
cal instrument to adjust optimally to a temporary increase in government
spending keeping debt level xed. The only di¤erence is that now we have a
25Another approach would be to use a policy reform that would raise a certain amount
of tax revenue as a share of output, i.e. 2% of output. Applying a change that will raise
a certain amount of income can be highly unbalanced for certain taxes. For example, the
returns from the consumption tax on entrepreneurs is 0.15% of output. Therefore, this
tax would need to increase about 12 times to raise the required income, whereas their
housing tax returns are about 1.75% of output and they would need to double. As a
result, this approach would not be helpful for our welfare analysis and comparison later
on. In addition, the main focus of the paper is on the qualititative aspect of the e¤ects
and not on their magnitude.
26Asimakopoulos et al. (2017) provide an analysis on how productive government spend-
ing a¤ect the economy and consumption in particular.
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permanent increase in government spending.
Table 6: E¤ects on output as a percentage deviation from the steady-state
T = t+ 1 T = t+ 10 T = t+ 100 T !1
Panel A: With Banks
G (B) 0.1233 0.1299 0.1363 0.1367
G (H) -0.2836 -0.1272 0.1155 0.1331
G (W ) -0.0804 -0.0472 -0.0013 0.0018
G (C) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
H (B) -0.0569 -0.0369 -0.0030 -0.0004
W (B) -0.1202 -0.1122 -0.1017 -0.1009
C (B) -0.0083 -0.0088 -0.0092 -0.0092
Panel B: Without Banks
G (B) 0.1252 0.1302 0.1398 0.1403
G (H) -0.1919 -0.1884 0.1147 0.1349
G (W ) -0.7120 -0.7311 -0.6738 -0.6695
G (C) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
H (B) -0.0428 -0.0441 -0.0035 -0.0005
W (B) -0.2079 -0.2099 -0.2090 -0.2089
C (B) -0.4e 4 -0.0251 -0.0193 -0.0184
We observe that when government spending is nanced via a housing tax
there is a reduction in output in the short-run which only becomes positive
in the long-run. This is in contrast to the temporary shock presented in the
previous section were we observed positive economic e¤ects from the impact
of the shock due to the anticipated reduction in housing tax in the future. In
addition, when government spending is nanced via higher labour income tax
we observe similar results to the temporary shock under optimal scal policy
for both cases, with and without banks. Specically, we nd again a more
pronounced negative e¤ect on output when labour income tax is increased
to nance spending when banks are not present. Finally, consumption tax
has again no signicant e¤ect on output, which is consistent with our results
under optimal scal policy and Fernandez-Villaverde (2010).
In the case of a higher housing tax nanced via debt we observe similar
patterns in both cases. However, we should note here the stronger initial
reaction of the economy to a permanent 1% increase in the real estate tax
when banks are present. Even in the case without banks the borrowing
constraints are still present but the patient households are not constraint
in providing loans, in contrast to the banks that are subject to the capital
adequacy constraint. Therefore, the initial impact of the housing tax is
stronger with banks, but in the long run banks can mitigate the impact with
25
minor spillover e¤ects to the economy. That happens mainly through the
restriction of transforming savings to investment.
In particular, the increase of housing tax has a stronger negative impact
on patient households. Patient households reduce their housing stock due to
the higher tax and they also reduce their labour supply due to the higher
inow of transfers following the decline in output and debt. The e¤ects on
impatient households are similar. Entrepreneurs though react di¤erently to
the higher real estate tax because housing is not welfare enhancing for them.
They only have indirect gains through the use of real-estate as an input in the
production process. Therefore, the households care more about increasing
their housing stock compared to the entrepreneurs due to the direct utility
gains. Finally, the results are qualitatively similar with and without banks.
The results form the labour income tax policy reform are very interesting.
Under the case with banks the e¤ect of a permanent increase in the labour
income tax is negative to the economy with an initial decrease of about 0.12%
in output. In the long run though this initial negative e¤ect slowly decreases
and in the long run it stabilizes at about -0.1%. When we move on to the
case without banks we observe that the negative e¤ect on the economy is
doubled. In addition, this higher initial negative impact on the economy
doesnt decline in the long-run, as in the case with banks, and it stays at the
level of about -0.21%, which is two times higher compared to the negative
e¤ect in the economy for the case with banks.
Therefore, under the case of constrained banks, that e¤ectively control
the amount of savings transformed into investment goods, the negative e¤ects
from a higher labour income tax are mitigated, whereas under a frictionless
economy, where patient households provide the loans without any constraint,
these e¤ects are amplied. This result veries our ndings in the previous
section where we allowed for the government to optimally choose the labor
tax rate under uncertainty.27
Finally, under the case of a permanent increase in the consumption tax
we observe that the initial negative impact on the economy is stronger with
banks and milder without banks. However, in the long run we nd that the
negative spillover e¤ect to output is two times higher compared to the case
with banks.
Overall, the various scal policy reforms presented above show that the
least favorable tax rate to be used to nance debt and/or higher government
27Having a labour tax on patient households without banks is similar to having a re-
duction in the net worth of banks. As Iacoviello (2015) has shown, a reduction in the net
worth of banks leads to a reduction in the supply of loans a¤ecting output. Therefore,
the negative spillover e¤ects to the economy from an increase in the labour income tax of
patient households are amplied under the no-banks case.
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spending is the labour income tax. This is again in line with our earliest
results and with the labour tax smoothing literature which shows that capital
taxes should be used as a shock absorbing mechanism and not labour taxes,
i.e. Chari et al. (1994). However, these experiments show an interesting
asymmetry in the quantitative e¤ect of the change in labour income tax with
and without banks.
5.1 Welfare e¤ects of scal policy reforms
In this section we report the welfare e¤ects from the various policy reforms
presented above using the consumption equivalence approach as in the case
with optimal scal policy. Here we assume that the welfare of each agent
after the policy reform is given by W prJ and before the policy reform by W
0
J ,
then the consumption equivalent gain/loss of each agent from that reform is
given by: j = exp
0@(W prJ  W 0J ) 11P
t=0
tj
1A  1
Similarly to Tables 4 and 5, the values reported in Table 7 are for t!1.
In addition, positive values indicate that the agent is better o¤ under the
policy reform and vice versa. In addition, as in Table 6, the variable in the
brackets in the rst column indicates the residual instrument that adjusts fol-
lowing the permanent scal policy reform to balance the government budget
27
constraint.
Table 7: Welfare e¤ects (% of consumption equivalent)
Patient hh Impatient hh Entrepr. Bank
Panel A: With Banks
G (B) -0.1175 -0.3422 -0.9852 -0.0526
G (H) -0.2871 -0.5981 -0.9334 -1.7359
G (W ) -0.3489 -0.4365 -0.0667 -0.3457
G (C) -0.3316 -0.3172 -0.3172 -0.3186
H (B) -0.0133 -0.0587 -0.1063 -0.9899
W (B) -0.1916 -0.0416 0.6573 -0.2082
C (B) -0.0142 0.0048 0.0424 -0.0177
Panel B: Without Banks
G (B) -0.0731 -0.3984 -1.1023 -
G (H) -0.2092 -0.7844 -0.9198 -
G (W ) -0.0493 -1.4781 0.7207 -
G (C) -0.3196 -0.3056 -0.3056 -
H (B) -0.0144 -0.1079 -0.1942 -
W (B) 0.0645 -0.1984 0.4505 -
C (B) -0.0375 -0.0876 0.1817 -
The results in Panel A and Panel B of Table 7 show that the welfare
of every agent is decreasing under the case of higher government spending,
irrespective the method of nancing, with a more signicant e¤ect on the
borrowers.
When the higher government spending is nanced via debt (rst row) it
also a¤ects negatively the transfers via the scal rules, causing a reduction
in the disposable income. Agents that are borrowers, impatient households
and entrepreneurs, rely more on their disposable income compared to patient
households. Hence we observe larger negative welfare e¤ects for them.
We also assess the cases where government spending is nanced via either
housing tax or labour income tax or consumption tax. These results are again
comparable with that of Table 5, where we had one scal instrument to adjust
optimally at a time, with the only di¤erence that now we have a permanent
increase in government spending. As a result the welfare e¤ects we obtain in
Table 7 are even more pronounced compared to that of Table 5 from the use
of distortionary taxes as a method to nance higher government spending.
For the case of a higher real estate tax we observe similar reaction in
the welfare of all agents in Panel A and B. It is noticeable though that the
welfare decrease is larger for the borrowers when there are no banks.
The welfare of both households is reduced under a higher labour income
tax when banks are present, with higher decrease in the welfare of patient
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households. However, when banks are not present we observe a signicant
increase in the welfare of the patient households, whereas the entrepreneurs
are still better o¤ because they are not subject to a labour tax and they
receive higher transfers due to the income redistribution. However, the dif-
ference between the two households is amplied under the no-banks case,
which means that patient households gain all the benets from the income
redistribution and their ability to smooth out their consumption.
Regarding the consumption tax, under the case with banks patient house-
holds are negatively a¤ected from the income redistribution via transfers,
whereas impatient households and entrepreneurs are positively a¤ected. Banks
are negatively a¤ected as expected since we have assumed that they do not
receive any lump-sum transfers. However, in the case without banks, only
the entrepreneurs gain from the income redistribution via the higher con-
sumption tax.
5.2 Robustness checks
In this subsection we assess the spillover e¤ects to the economy from the
scal policy reforms under several assumptions around the imposed nancial
constraints. The ultimate aim of this analysis is to assess how the change
in the nancial frictions can a¤ect the transmission of the shocks to the
economy. Thus, Table 8 presents the results in terms of percentage change in
output from the benchmark steady state. These results can then be directly
compared to the last column of Table 6 and for the case with banks, to assess
whether the imposed structural changes assumed in this section can boost
the economy.28
Under the rst experiment we assume that banks adequacy of capital is
lower, newB = 0:5B (rst column in Table 8). In this case we do not observe
signicant changes compared to our benchmark calibration.
Then we assess the case where banks liabilities to asset ratio is reduced,
new = 0:75, which means that banks face a stricter screening process for
giving out their loans (second column in Table 8). In this case the signicant
change appears to be on the spillover e¤ect of housing tax to output which
becomes positive. This result is driven from the higher positive e¤ects of
a higher housing tax on patient households and the decline in the negative
e¤ect from the housing tax on entrepreneurs. However, we should note that
still the overall e¤ect on the economy is very small.
Another experiment we perform is through the borrowing constraints of
28Note that in these experiments we only show the results where a policy reform is met
via a change in debt to satisfy the government budget constraint.
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the impatient households and entrepreneurs. In particular, we assume that
they are less restricted in terms of the loans they can obtain given their collat-
eral, mnewI = 0:75mI (third column in Table 8) and m
new
EH = 0:75mEH (fourth
column in Table 8). In both cases, we observe only minor changes compared
to the benchmark calibration coming from the higher positive spillover e¤ects
to the economy from the increased government spending and housing tax.
Finally, we assess the impact of a direct transfer to banks from the gov-
ernment of a size similar to the quantitative easing that took place in the US.
For that reason we assume that banks receive a transfer of about 5% of the
overall output in the economy (last column in Table 8). Interestingly in this
case we do not observe any signicant improvement to the economy apart
from the minor improvement in the negative e¤ects from the higher labour
income tax. However, we should note that our results in this case are biased
because we only provide transfers to banks without any other changes in the
assumed nancial frictions.
Overall, we conclude from these experiments that our results from the
benchmark calibration are robust to changes in various parameters of the
imposed nancial constraints.29
Table 8: E¤ects on output as a % deviation from the steady-state
0:5B 0:75 0:75mI 0:75mEH trB= y  5%
Panel A: With Banks and aggregate policy reforms
G (B) 0.1367 0.1359 0.1378 0.1364 0.1371
H (B) -0.0003 0.0021 0.0028 -0.0004 -0.0005
W (B) -0.1009 -0.0997 -0.0994 -0.1001 -0.0975
C (B) -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0093 -0.0092 -0.0096
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a scal sector in a real business cycle model
with banks, patient and impatient households, entrepreneurs and nancial
frictions. We found that the existence of banks can mitigate the negative
spillover e¤ects to the economy from higher taxes under both optimal scal
policy and various scal policy reforms.
Optimal scal policy experiments under uncertainty conrmed that labour
taxes were the most distortionary scal policy instrument. We also found
that housing tax, as a source of nancing temporary increased government
spending, could lead to higher output in the short run. Furthermore, the
29We have also performed similar robustness checks for the optimal scal policy exper-
iments and there are no changes to our key results.
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combination of labour and housing taxes were, on average, the most pre-
ferred tax bundle.
In addition, the scal policy reforms experiments veried the optimal s-
cal policy outcome of housing taxes. In addition, permanently higher housing
taxes and government spending a¤ected mostly borrowerswelfare, whereas a
higher consumption tax was benecial for impatient households when banks
were present. Entrepreneurs were mainly better o¤ following an increase in
the consumption tax due to the income redistribution via transfers. We also
found that a decrease in the net worth of loan suppliers amplied the neg-
ative spillover e¤ects to the economy. Finally, our main results were robust
in changes to the calibration of the nancial constraints.
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AppendixA: FOCs for patient, impatient house-
holds, entrepreneurs and banks
Patient households
The rst-order conditions of patient households with respect to their choice
variables are:
FOC for labour:
UCP (t)
(1 + Ct )
 
1  Wt

WP;t + UNP (t) = 0 (A1)
shows that patient households want to equate the after-tax returns from
labour to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour.
FOC for deposits:
PEtfUCP (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
 RP;tg   UCP (t)
(1 + Ct )
= 0 (A2)
shows that patient households want to equate the interest income from de-
posits to the marginal cost of forgone consumption from higher deposits.
FOC for housing demand:
PEtfUCP (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
  1  Ht  qt+1g+ UHP (t)  qt UCP (t)(1 + Ct ) = 0 (A3)
shows that patient households want to equate the expected after-tax return
from housing to the marginal utility gain from the additional housing and
the marginal cost of obtaining a higher stock of housing.
FOC for bonds:
PEtfUCP (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
 RB;tg   UCP (t)
(1 + Ct )
= 0 (A4)
where UCP (t) =
1
CP;t
; UNP (t) =   1 NP;t and UHP (t) =
jAjt
HP;t
.
Similarly to deposits, the rst order condition for bonds shows that pa-
tient households want to equate the interest income from bonds to the mar-
ginal cost of forgone consumption from higher bond holdings.
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Impatient households
FOC for labour:
UCI (t)
(1 + Ct )
 
1  Wt

WI;t + UNI (t) = 0 (A5)
similarly to patient households, it shows that impatient households want to
equate the after-tax returns from labour to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labour.
FOC for housing demand:
0 = IEtfUCI (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
  1  Ht  qt+1g+ UHI (t)  qt UCI (t)(1 + Ct )+ (A6)
+ I;t(1  I)AMt mI
 
1  Ht

Etfqt+1
RI;t
g UCI (t)
(1 + Ct )
shows that impatient households want to equate the expected after-tax return
from housing to the marginal utility gain from the additional housing and
the marginal cost of obtaining a higher stock of housing. The additional
term I;t measures the credit constraint faced by the impatient households
and introduces an intertemporal wedge to the housing demand.
FOC for loans:
IEtf(RI;t   II;t+1)UCI (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
 g = (1  I;t) UCI (t)
(1 + Ct )
(A7)
where UCI (t) =
1
CI;t
; UNI (t) =   1 NI;t and UHI (t) =
jAjt
HI;t
.
The rst order condition for loans shows that impatient households want
to equate the interest payment on loans and the marginal cost of future
forgone consumption to the marginal gain of current consumption. The la-
grange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint of the impatient
households, I;t, introduces an intertemporal wedge again to loans demand
as in the rst order condition for housing demand.
Banks
FOC for deposits:
(1  B;t) UCB (t)
(1 + Ct )
= BEtf(RP;t   BB;t+1)UCB (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
 g (A8)
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shows that banks want to equate the pay-o¤ from an additional consump-
tion today due to higher deposits to the cost of paying back the interest on
deposits and the marginal cost of lower future consumption. B;t measures
the credit constraint faced by banks and introduces an intertemporal wedge
to the demand for deposits.
FOC for loans to impatient households:
(1  ( (1  B) + B)  B;t) UCB (t)
(1 + Ct )
= BEtf(RI;t   BB;t+1)UCB (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
 g (A9)
FOC for loans to entrepreneurs:
(1  ( (1  B) + B)  B;t) UCB (t)
(1 + Ct )
= BEtf(RE;t+1   BB;t+1)UCB (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
 g (A10)
where UCB (t) =
1
CB;t
and the variable B;t is the lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the borrowing constraint.
In both conditions above banks want to equate the additional consump-
tion today via lower loans to the marginal utility cost of tighter borrowing
constraint. B;t measures the credit constraint faced by banks and introduces
again an intertemporal wedge to the supply of loans.
Entrepreneurs
FOC for loans:
(1  E;t) UCE (t)
(1 + Ct )
= EEtf(RE;t   EE;t+1)UCE (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
 g (A11)
The rst order condition for loans shows that entrepreneurs the interest
payment on loans and the marginal cost of future forgone consumption to
the marginal gain of current consumption. The lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the borrowing constraint of the entrepreneurs, E;t, introduces an
intertemporal wedge again to the demand for loans.
FOC for real estate:
(qt   E;t (1  E)AMt mEHEtf
 
1  Ht
 qt+1
RE;t+1
g) UCE (t)
(1 + Ct )
= EEtfqt+1(1 +RV;t+1)UCE (t+ 1) 
1 + Ct+1
 g (A12)
36
where UCE (t) =
1
CE;t
and the variable E;t is the lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the borrowing constraint.
The condition above shows that entrepreneurs equate the expected after-
tax return from real estate to the marginal cost of obtaining a higher stock of
real estate. The additional term E;t measures the credit constraint faced by
the entrepreneurs and introduces an intertemporal wedge to their real estate
demand.
Additionally, we combine the above conditions with the following stan-
dard rst order conditions of the production process were marginal return
equals marginal cost of the factors taking into account the credit constraint
of the entrepreneur:
Yt = Rv;tqtHE;t 1 (A13)
(1  )(1  ) Yt
NP;t
= WP;t (1 + (1  E)mENE;t) (A14)
(1  ) Yt
NI;t
= WI;t (1 + (1  E)mENE;t) (A15)
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